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This paper presents the main ¯ndings of a survey conducted on a sample of
Portuguese ¯rms. The main aim was to identify some relevant characteristics
about the dynamics of prices and wages in Portugal. The most important
conclusions are: i) changes to wages are more synchronized than changes to
prices; ii) most wages are de¯ned using in°ation as a yardstick, even though
there are no formal rules; iii) the wages of most workers are de¯ned in terms of
sector-related collective agreements; iv) a considerable proportion of workers
receive wages above those been agreed under the collective agreement; v)
¯rms make frequent use of other mechanisms to cut payroll costs as a way of
overcoming the restrictions imposed by downward nominal wage rigidity.
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11 Introduction
An appropriate de¯nition of economic policies in general and monetary policy in
particular requires a deeper understanding of the characteristics and determining
factors underlying wage dynamics. For a member of a monetary union like Por-
tugal, where the exchange rate instrument is no longer available to bring about
adjustments, wage °exibility becomes a fundamental requirement for ensuring an
adequate adjustment to shocks, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical. This has
been a topic of intense debate in Portugal where, following a large GDP contraction
in 2009, the unemployment rate has reached the two-digit psychological threshold
for the ¯rst time in many years. From the point of view of the euro area (EA) as a
whole, even though a number of reforms in labour markets have been put into place
in various countries, there are striking di®erences remaining in collective bargain-
ing procedures and other labour market institutions (see, for instance, Caju et al.
(2008)). Besides this, wages are also an important determinant of ¯rms' prices. Re-
cent microeconomic research, both qualitative and quantitative, suggests that those
sectors with a higher labour cost share, such as services, typically show a greater
rigidity in prices (see, for instance, Altissimo et al. (2006) and Fabiani et al. (2006,
2007)).
It is within this context that this paper details the ¯ndings of a survey carried out
by the Banco de Portugal in the ¯rst half of 2008 within the scope of its participation
in the WDN. The main aim of the paper is to identify some relevant characteristics
about the dynamics of prices and wages in Portugal. One natural criticism that can
be pointed out is that it addresses too many issues at the same time and none of them
is analysed in depth. In this context, I believe that those seeking for a theoretical
model and exhaustive econometric estimations may feel a bit disappointed. However,
this is far from being the target of the paper. Besides the innovative features of the
dataset used, the main strength of the paper is precisely the richness of the facts
reported. Many of them are consistent with previous ¯ndings about wage and price
setting in Portugal while others are completely new. Of course, a di®erent and
equally interesting approach could have been followed by narrowing the scope of
analysis and focusing on some speci¯c issues addressed in the survey. This is the
approach followed by Dias, Marques and Martins (2011) and Dias, Marques, Martins
and Silva (2010) who on the basis of a similar qualitative database analyse some
speci¯c features of ¯rms' pricing behaviour in Portugal.
One of the main advantages of using surveys is their °exibility. There is the
possibility of questioning ¯rms directly on a number of points relating to the way
they set prices or wages, such as the main obstacles to freezing or cutting wages,
2the most important factors determining wages or the ways they react to signi¯cant
changes either in demand or in production costs. This type of information, for in-
stance, cannot be obtained from large administrative databases such as the Ministry
for Labour and Social Solidarity Personnel Database (Quadros de Pessoal - QP) or
the Social Security Wage Database (Base de Dados do Registo de Remunera» c~ oes da
Seguran» ca Social - BDRR)1. Moreover, surveys that are not conducted directly with
the ¯rms may well throw up a number of problems. These relate both to the low
response rate normally obtained and to the possibility of ill-judged interpretation
of the questions raised. Apart from this, the responses may be coloured by other
factors, such as the way questions are formulated or the economic outlook in which
they occur.
The remaining of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 details
the process of sample selection, the questionnaire and the way the survey was con-
ducted. Section 3 describes some of the institutional characteristics of the labour
market that is being reviewed. The analysis is based on information from the survey,
and includes such things as the importance of collective contracts or the relative size
of the so-called wage cushion, i.e. the di®erence between e®ective and contracted
wages in Portugal. There is also a short comparison between the architecture of
the wage bargaining process in Portugal and the rest of Europe. Section 4 presents
some stylised facts about the dynamics of prices and wages in Portugal, as well as
the link between the two. Section 5 looks at the evidence on wage rigidity (real and
nominal) and describes some of adjustment strategies used by ¯rms as an alterna-
tive to changes in base wages. Section 6 looks at the reaction of ¯rms to di®erent




The survey was carried out by the Banco de Portugal between September 2007
and June 2008 on a sample covering manufacturing, energy, construction, retail and
1The Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity Personnel Database are collected annually by
the Strategy and Planning Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity from all
Portuguese ¯rms. The data is therefore tantamount to a census and is an extremely important
source of information for a microeconomic analysis of the labour market in Portugal, making it
possible to undertake longitudinal analysis of ¯rms and employees. Another very useful source
is the Social Security Wage Database. The information is collected on a monthly basis and is
permanently updated. It provides important data for an assessment of short-term movements in
the labour market.
3wholesale trade, transport and communications, education, health, ¯nancial services
and other business services. All told, there were 46 two-digit NACE sectors. There
were 4,850 ¯rms contacted to participate2. Compared with the survey conducted
in 2006 in the context of the Banco de Portugal participation in the In°ation Per-
sistence Network (see Martins (2010)), twice the number of ¯rms were contacted
and the number of sectors covered was increased signi¯cantly, particularly through
the inclusion of trade, construction and ¯nancial services. The ¯rms were chosen
from those on the Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity Personnel Database
(Quadros de Pessoal, QP). Given the prevalence of very small ¯rms in the Por-
tuguese production structure, a pure random selection of ¯rms would clearly have
led to over-representation of smaller-scale ¯rms. To solve this, the survey targeted
only ¯rms with ten or more workers. Data collection was split into two stages. For
the ¯rst, it was decided to include all ¯rms with 100 or more workers in the sectors
mentioned above. This provided 2,756 ¯rms. The remaining 2,244 were chosen on
the basis of random strati¯cation. The total number of ¯rms was divided into three
groups according to the number of their workers: i) ¯rms with 10 or more workers
but less than 20; ii) ¯rms with 20 or more workers but less than 50; and iii) ¯rms
with 50 or more workers but less than 100. Grouping these in the two-digit sec-
tors chosen led to 138 mutually exclusive strata. The number of ¯rms to be drawn
from each stratum was set on the basis of the relative frequency obtained in the QP
for 2005. Once this ¯gure was reached, the ¯rms within each stratum were chosen
randomly. The ¯nal sample included 1,872 ¯rms from manufacturing, 25 from the
energy sector, 657 from the construction, 841 from trade, 82 from ¯nancial services
and 1,373 from other business services, such as education, health, transport and
communications. These ¯rms represented around 35 per cent of total employment
in Portugal. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix show further details on the sample
coverage.
2.2 Structure and methodology for carrying out the survey
The questionnaire was developed within the scope of the WDN and was based on
a set of common questions for all 17 national central banks involved. This was
organised in four sections, corresponding to 39 questions (the English version of
the questionnaire sent to the ¯rms is attached to the paper). The opportunity
provided by the survey was also used to include some additional questions, as a way
2There were 5,000 chosen, but the survey was only sent to 4,850 because it was found µ a posteriori
that some ¯rms had merged and others had closed. In addition, some ¯rms that took part in the
pilot survey were not included in the ¯nal sample, given that the questionnaire they had received
was di®erent in some ways from the ¯nal version.
4to look into some speci¯c aspects related to the price and wage setting practices in
Portugal, among them the size and importance of the so-called wage cushion (the
di®erence between e®ective and contracted wages), the relevance of labour legislation
and collective contracts as limiting factors in wage bargaining and questions on price
setting (based on the the 2004 survey experience), such as the speed of price reactions
following signi¯cant changes in costs or demand. An attempt was made to avoid
technical language in the questions so that as many people could understand them
as possible. After the sample was set up, in September 2007, a ¯rst version of the
questionnaire was sent to 30 ¯rms. As in the 2004 survey, the pilot questionnaire
turned out to be very useful for an initial assessment of how the project was received
and whether it was viable. A number of ¯rms were contacted on the basis of the
¯rst replies and some questions were rephrased or cut out, making the questionnaire
shorter and easier to understand. In October, a revised version was sent to all the
¯rms chosen, together with a letter signed by the Head of the Research Department.
The letter made it clear, among other things, that the questionnaire should be
answered by someone who was very well aware of the range of procedures underlying
how wages and prices were determined. More than one person could answer it, as
long as there was an overall consistency in the replies. In addition, there was a
number of questions speci¯cally for the banking sector. This contained a number of
di®erences from the base version, especially as regards the concept of price in this
sector. After receiving the questionnaire, the ¯rms had 15 working days to send
their replies, which could be either paper based or through an Internet site specially
set up for this purpose3. In mid-January 2008, a reminder was sent to all the ¯rms
that had to that date not replied. All the replies were received by June. There were
1,499 valid questionnaires received, which corresponde to a 32 per cent reply rate.
This percentage was lower than for the 2004 survey (which had been 55 per cent),
but it was higher than original expectations, given that this was a more complex
questionnaire, covering a topic that was especially sensitive for some ¯rms, as it is
the case of their wage setting practices.
3A help line was set up for ¯rms to request clari¯cation. They were able to use telephone, fax
or e-mail.
53 Some aspects of the institutional architecture
of wage bargaining in Portugal
The Portuguese Constitution provides the juridical principles of collective bargaining
and grants unions the right to negotiate4. The e®ects of the agreements are formally
recognized and considered valid sources of labour law.
Concerning the bargaining mechanisms, a distinction should be made between
the conventional regime and the mandatory regime. Conventional bargaining re-
sults from direct negotiation between employers' and workers' representatives. A
mandatory regime, on the other hand, does not result from direct bargaining be-
tween workers and employers, being instead dictated by the Ministry of Labour.
The Ministry can extend an existing collective agreement to other workers initially
not covered by it or it can create a new one, if it is not viable to extend the ap-
plication of an existing document. A mandatory regime is applied when workers
are not covered by unions, when one of the parties involved refuses to negotiate or
bargaining is obstructed in any other way5. Therefore, the impact of collective bar-
gaining goes far beyond union membership and the distinction between unionized
and non-unionized workers or ¯rms becomes unimportant.
Collective negotiations are usually conducted at the industry or occupation level.
The law does not establish mechanisms of coordination between agreements reached
in di®erent negotiations. However, preference is given to vertical over horizontal
agreements, and the principle of the most favourable condition to the worker gen-
erally applies.
Since most collective agreements are industry-wide, covering companies with very
di®erent sizes and economic conditions, their contents tend to be general, setting
minimum working conditions, in particular the base monthly wage for each category
of workers, overtime pay and the normal duration of work. Underlying the bargain-
ing process there is a mandatory minimum monthly wage which sets the minimum
°oor for wage negotiations6.
4Portugal (2006) and Marques et al. (2010) provide a detailed description of the Portuguese
wage bargaining system.
5Beyond the existence of compulsive extension mechanisms, voluntary extensions are also pos-
sible, when one economic partner (workers' representative or employer) decides to subscribe to an
agreement which it had initially not signed.
6Currently, there is a unique legal minimum wage that applies to all workers. Workers formally
classi¯ed as apprentices receive just 80 percent of the full rate. The minimum wage is updated
annually by the parliament, under government proposal. Decisions on the level of the minimum
wage are taken on a discretionary basis, usually taking into account past and predicted in°ation
and after consulting the social partners. For 2011, the minimum monthly wage was set at 480
euros
6The Portuguese system of industrial relations apparently presents features of a
centralized wage bargaining system7. Massive collective agreements, often covering
a whole industry, predominate in the economy, while ¯rm-level collective bargaining
covers a low proportion of the workforce. Moreover, trade union confederations, em-
ployers' federations and the Government meet at the national level each year to set
a guideline for wage increases (the so-called social concertation). Yet, this guideline
is not mandatory and merely guides the collective bargaining that follows. However,
the fragmented nature of the trade union structure, the fragmented employers' asso-
ciations and the multiplicity of bargaining units provides the system with a certain
degree of decentralization. Even though collective bargaining in Portugal takes place
at a sectoral level and most workers are covered by the bargaining system due to
the existence of mandatory extensions, the coordination between bargaining units
is rather limited. In fact, the right to negotiate is given upon every employer or
employers' association and to every trade union (regardless of the number of a±li-
ated members they represent), and the parties have the possibility of choosing the
level of negotiation - regional, occupational, industrial or national. This leads to
the existence of a di®use and complex system of wage bargaining with negotiation
fragmented and agreements multiplied.
The institutional framework of wage bargaining is usually seen as playing an
important role in determining the dynamics of wages and, in general, of the labour
market itself. Druant et al. (2009) show that labour market institutions in°uence
the frequency and timing of wage changes, while Babecky et al. (2009a) and Dickens
et al. (2007) show that the institutional framework is also an important determinant
of downward wage rigidity. In addition, institutions seem to in°uence the reaction of
¯rms to shocks, as suggested by Bertola et al. (2010), as well as the degree to which
¯rms use available adjustment policies to reduce labour costs. This is documented
in Babecky et al. (2009b). There is in fact a vast body of literature that looks at
the impact of the institutional frameworks where decisions are taken on wages as
a result of the wage bargaining process (including decisions on wage levels, wage
7Caju et al. (2008) perform a cluster analysis and identify three groups of countries using in-
formation collected following a questionnaire to national central banks. The ¯rst group (Austria,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) mainly
consists of countries with a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining. This group is character-
ized by the existence of extension procedures and a high level of collective agreement coverage, a
dominance of sectoral wage bargaining and the general absence of coordination. The second group
(Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain) exhibits the same general wage set-
ting characteristics as the previous group, but, in addition, some form of indexation, intersectoral
agreements and the role of government are all more important. Finally, the third group (Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Poland, the UK and the US) gathers the countries
where the wage bargaining system is largely deregulated.
7dispersion and rigidity)8.
Despite the importance given to the role of institutional wages, the information
available from international sources is rather scarce9. The survey provides infor-
mation on a range of institutional characteristics that may in°uence wage decisions
in Portugal, among them the degree of centralised decision-making, collective con-
tract coverage or the relative importance of contracted wages. The main conclusions
relating to wage institutions in Portugal are summed up below.
The wages of most workers, above all those in larger ¯rms, are determined in the
context of collective agreements at the sectoral level. In around 60 per cent of ¯rms
wages are set through agreements of this nature, although in only 30 per cent of the
cases are the ¯rms directly involved in the negotiations (Figure 1)10. Furthermore,
9.7 per cent of the ¯rms apply ¯rm-level wage agreements: in 6.9 per cent ¯rm-level
and sectoral agreements coexist, whereas in 2.8 per cent ¯rm-level agreements are
exclusive. As might be expected, collective wage agreements are more important in
larger ¯rms11. There is little di®erence between the sectors analysed.
The share of workers covered by collective agreements (either sectoral or ¯rm-
level) is signi¯cant, and it is considerably higher than the estimates for the union
density. This phenomenon is frequently explained by a simple fact: although in legal
terms the agreements are only binding for unionised workers and ¯rms a±liated
to employers associations, the collective agreement is typically extended to all the
workers and ¯rms in a speci¯c sector. This can be done on a voluntary basis, or
through extension procedures issued by Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity.
According to the Employment Outlook of the OECD, in 2004, union density in
Portugal in 2000 stood at 24 per cent (compared with 61 per cent in 1980 and 32 per
cent in 1990). More recent data, from the International Social Survey Programme,
published in the Labour Relations White Book, point to a 17 per cent rate in 2007.
These ¯gures are considerably lower than the average percentage of workers covered
by collective agreements as found in our survey (Figure 2). The level of coverage is
particularly high in the ¯nancial services and tends to increase with the size of the
¯rms.
8For a summary of the recent literature on the subject, see Freeman (2007).
9The OECD has probably the most comprehensive database in this ¯eld. It provides quanti-
tative information on an array of developed countries relating to the percentage of cover through
collective contracts, unionisation rates, the importance of minimum wages and the degree of coor-
dination and decentralisation of decisions (see, for example, Elmeskov et al. (1998))
10Unless otherwise stated, all the results shown are weighted in terms of the relative size of each
¯rm measured on the basis of the number of workers. Blank replies were excluded.
11In the context of the analysis ¯rms were split according to their size into the following cate-
gories: i) very small ¯rms (between 10 and 19 workers); ii) small ¯rms (between 20 and 49 workers);
iii) medium-sized ¯rms (between 50 and 199 workers); and iv) large ¯rms (more than 199 workers).
8Figure 1: Share of ¯rms with wages set under sectoral collective wage agreements




















































































































































Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
Figure 2: Share of workers covered by collective wage agreements




















































































































































Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
9Figure 3: Share of workers with base wages above the wage scale




















































































































































Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
It is worth noting, however, that the wage scale agreed in the context of collective
wage agreements is taken in many cases merely as a reference. Indeed, a signi¯cant
number of ¯rms pay wages above those agreed under collective wage agreements
(Figure 3). The share of ¯rms paying this wage cushion is particularly high in
¯nancial services12. Cardoso and Portugal (2005) estimate that the e®ective wages
in 1999 exceed contracted wages in amount that varies between 20 and 50 per cent.
The ¯gure obtained in the survey is 25 per cent. From the point of view of the ¯rms,
the way this cushion is handled makes it a strategic bu®er against adverse shocks,
in particular in a context where downward nominal wage rigidity turns out to be an
active constraint.
4 The behaviour of prices and wages: duration
and interaction
As mentioned before, one of the most robust facts coming out of recent microeco-
nomic evidence points to the fact that those sectors with higher labour cost shares
tend to show a higher degree of price rigidity (see Altissimo et al. (2006); Fabiani
et al. (2006)). This in turn is frequently suggested as sign of greater wage rigidity.
Non-¯nancial services - a sector where the labour cost share is typically high - are
often cited as an example where the degree of price °exibility is strongly a®ected by
12Financial services include the banking sector and the insurance companies.
10Figure 4: Frequency of price changes




















































































































































No regular pattern Less than annually Annually From quarterly to half-yearly From daily to monthly
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
wage rigidity. Dias, Marques, Martins and Silva (2010) show that the cost structure
is an important determinant of how fast ¯rms react to cost and demand shocks
shocks. In particular, they present evidence that ¯rms with higher shares of labour
costs react slower to demand and cost shocks. In addition, Altissimo et al. (2006)
show that ¯rms with higher labour cost shares tend to exhibit lower frequencies of
price adjustment. The ¯ndings from our survey seem to be consistent with these
conclusions. An analysis of price frequency shows that around 70 per cent of ¯rms
do not change prices more than once a year; with this percentage being particularly
high in the case of non-¯nancial services (Figure 4).
Moreover, in non-¯nancial services, unlike other sectors, there is a predominance
of time-dependent rules. Here, price revisions are typically carried out at speci¯c
moments of the year and, unlike state-dependent price setting rules, they do not
depend on current economic conditions (Figure 5). In the presence of shocks, time-
dependent rules typically lead to greater price rigidity. Dias, Marques and Martins
(2011) show that the frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to
shocks of time-dependent ¯rms is signi¯cantly lower than that of state-dependent
¯rms, while ¯rms that are both time- and state-dependent rank in between.
Another way of assessing price rigidity, alternative to the more common approach
based on frequency analysis, is to ¯nd out directly from the ¯rms what is speed of
price reactions to signi¯cant changes in costs or demand. In line with previous
evidence, Figure 6 points to greater rigidity in non-¯nancial services, with ¯rms
11Figure 5: Price-setting rules: time-dependent vs. state-dependent price setting


































































































































State-dependent Time-dependent (under normal circumstances) Time-dependent (strictly)
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
here taking on average between 8.1 and 9.3 months to adjust their prices, depending
on the type of shock13. This analysis excludes those ¯rms that apply time-dependent
pricing rules strictly which account for about 25 percent of the total sample. The
¯ndings also show that ¯rms appear to react more quickly to positive shocks on the
cost side and negative shocks on the demand side.
As a complement to this evidence, the survey looked into the link between the
frequency of price changes and the frequency of wage changes. The aim was, in
particular, to get answers to the following questions: i) how does the frequency
of price changes compares with the frequency of wage changes? ii) is there any
synchronisation between changes in prices and changes in wages? and iii) are there
signi¯cant di®erences across sectors regarding the frequency and timing of wage and
price changes and their relationship? The approach used in the analysis of price
change frequency was di®erent from the procedure for wage change frequency. In
terms of prices, the ¯rms were asked directly about the frequency of change, while for
wages the frequency of change was analysed through three di®erent questions: the
changes stemming from moves in in°ation, changes deriving from tenure and those
related to other factors. One composite (downward-biased) measure was calculated
for the three motivations, de¯ned as the highest frequency of wage change for each
13By estimating a panel-ordered probit model, Dias, Marques, Martins and Silva (2010) ¯nd
that the lags of price adjustments vary with the sector, product, and ¯rm characteristics, namely
the cost structure of the ¯rm, the type of pricing policy, the competitive environment, the di®erent
factors of competitiveness, or the type of good.
12Figure 6: Speed of price reaction to demand and cost shocks
(excluding ¯rms that follow time-dependent pricing rules strictly)
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Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
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¯rm, irrespective of the speci¯c determining factor. Results show that the wages of
most workers (85 percent) are changed only once per year (Figure 7). In order to
simplify the comparison, a proxy for the average duration of wage and price spells
was computed by simply multiplying each point category by its respective frequency.
For those categories expressed though intervals the mid-point was assumed14. Table
1 shows that prices in ¯nancial services, construction and trade have short durations
when compared to manufacturing and other non-¯nancial services. However, the
results obtained for the ¯nancial sector should be interpreted with some caution,
not only because the concept of reference price in this sector may not be absolutely
clear, but also because the questionnaire was ¯lled in during a period of turmoil
in the international ¯nancial markets and this may have coloured in some way the
replies from the institutions concerned15. When compared with the EA as a whole,
price spells in Portugal are apparently slightly longer.
As expected, the average duration of wage spells is higher than that of price
spells (at least about 2.0 months on average), and it also shows a smaller sector
variability16. When compared with the EA as a whole, wages remain constant for
14Others more complex distribution-based techniques were also used to assess the robustness
of these durations. Even though the results vary somewhat with the distributional assumptions,
those di®erences were qualitatively of minor signi¯cance.
15As mentioned in section 2, the questionnaire that was sent to banks was somewhat di®erent
from the base version. The biggest di®erence was in the section related to price setting. In
particular, ¯rms were asked to take as a reference price the interest rate applied to their main
credit product, assuming a customer with average risk.
16The composite wage duration measure shown in Table 1 was computed on the basis of the
13Figure 7: Frequency of wage changes






































































































More than once per year Annually Once every two years Less than once every two years
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
Table 1: Average duration of wage and price spells
(in months)
Price Composite Memo: Wage durations due to
duration wage duration In°ation Tenure Other factors
Total 11.2 12.9 17.8 25.9 18.5
Manufacturing 10.9 12.7 16.1 26.0 17.9
Construction 7.7 13.9 21.9 22.2 19.3
Trade 11.2 11.3 16.3 27.5 19.2
Business services 11.7 13.1 19.3 26.5 18.4
Financial services 7.4 11.9 12.7 18.4 22.0
Very small ¯rms 10.9 15.0 20.3 25.0 20.2
Small ¯rms 11.5 14.6 19.2 23.7 20.1
Medium-sized ¯rms 11.0 14.1 18.5 25.2 18.7
Large ¯rms 11.3 12.4 17.4 26.2 18.4
Memo:
Euro Area 9.6 14.7 - - -
Source: Druant et al. (2009) and Martins (2009).
Results weighted by employment.
14Figure 8: Concentration of price and wage setting decisions
(as a percentage of total ¯rms in the sample; unweighted results)













81% of firms change wages 
in specific months
37% of firms change prices 
in specific months
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). Values computed as a share of all firms with valid responses. The sum 
of percentages exceed the proportion of firms that change wages or prices in specific months as they could choose more 
than one month.
an average period that is around 2 months shorter. Druant et al. (2009) show
that the di®erences between European countries in terms of wage durations are
signi¯cant, though they are relatively slight in terms of sectors. The opposite is true
for prices, where the di®erences between countries are of only minor signi¯cance, but
signi¯cant in terms of sectors. These results are consistent with the evidence that
di®erences between ¯rms in terms of frequency of price adjustments are determined
to a large extent by their degree of competition and their labour cost share, while
di®erences between frequencies of wage changes is to a large extent a re°ection of
national institutional factors. Another equally relevant factor in the assessment of
¯rms' °exibility when they face changes in their economic environment is the degree
of synchronisation between price changes and wage changes. In order to obtain
empirical evidence on this point, ¯rms were asked whether changes to their prices
occur without any de¯ned time pattern or if, on the contrary, those changes occur
largely in speci¯c months of the year. According to the information obtained, in 37
per cent of ¯rms price changes are concentrated in speci¯c months of the year, and
64 per cent of these ¯rms adjust their prices in January (Figure 8).
Firms were also asked whether changes to wages occurred in speci¯c months of
the year or whether there was no temporal pattern de¯ned. The results show that the
degree of concentration of wage changes is considerably higher than that of prices,
with 81 per cent of wages changed in speci¯c months of the year. January is the
highest frequency of wage change for each ¯rm, irrespective of the speci¯c determining factor
(in°ation, tenure or other). This measure is somewhat downward biased.
15Figure 9: Synchronisation between price and wage setting decisions



























































































No link No regular pattern Decisions taken simultaneously Prices set after wages Wages set after prices
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).  
month with the largest number of changes. The fact that most decisions on wages
are made in January is probably institutional by nature, both at sectoral level and
at ¯rm level, a re°ection of collective labour conventions17. Firms were also asked
about the possible connection between the timing of their price setting and wage
setting decisions. The intensity and direction of this connection is illustrated in
Figure 9. The results suggest that there is some degree of synchronisation between
the timing of price and wage changes, with around 50 per cent of ¯rms recognising
that a connection does exist. However, only 20 per cent admit that the link is strong:
in 7 per cent the decisions are taken at the same time, in 9 per cent changes in prices
are taken only after wages are set, and in 4 per cent changes in wages occur only
after prices are set. In contrast, in around half of the ¯rms there does not seem to
be any link between the timing of both decisions.
However, the lack of synchronisation between the two decisions at the micro
level does not necessarily imply that the behaviour of in°ation is irrelevant when it
comes to setting wages. Survey results show that, among the several factors a®ecting
the frequency of wage changes, in°ation is the one triggering most frequent wage
adjustments in frequencies greater or equal to one year (Figure 10).
17The big convergence of changes in wages in speci¯c periods of the year may also have an impact
on the way that monetary policy decisions a®ect the real economy. Olivei and Tenreyro (2008)
quote, for example, the case of Japan, where most ¯rms ¯x their wages between February and May
each year (the so-called "Shunto" or great o®ensive). Results show that a monetary policy shock
in the ¯rst half of the year - when wages are more °exible - produces less of an impact on economic
activity than one towards the end of the year.
16Figure 10: Frequency of wage changes
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Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).  
The existence of wage indexation mechanisms is another factor a®ecting the way
price changes are transmitted to wages. The survey includes two questions that are
geared to assessing the way the in°ation behaviour is re°ected in ¯rms' base wages.
In the ¯rst, ¯rms were asked if the issue of in°ation was a consideration when they set
their base wages. If yes, they were asked to indicate whether the in°ation behaviour
is re°ected automatically in base wages, for instance through an explicit indexation
rule, or if it is used only as a non-formal reference for wage setting. Firms should
also indicate if the most relevant in°ation for setting base wages is the past or the
expected rate. Table 2 shows that the wages of around 65 per cent of workers are
set with in°ation as a point of reference, though in most cases this is done only
informally. This ¯gure is higher than the average for the EA, though less than in
some countries, such as Spain or Belgium. In these, unlike Portugal, the bargaining
systems are characterised by strong automatic wage indexation mechanisms (see
European Central Bank (2008) for a summary of the importance of wage indexation
in several EA countries). On the other hand, expected in°ation seems to be more
relevant in Portugal than past in°ation. This goes against the trend in most other
countries, where past in°ation is of greater importance (Druant et al. (2009)).
17Table 2: How in°ation behaviour is re°ected in ¯rms' base wages
(in percentage)
Automatically No formal rule
Past Expected Past Expected Total
in°ation in°ation in°ation in°ation
Total 1.8 4.8 15.4 42.7 64.6
Manufacturing 3.2 5.9 15.3 44.6 69.1
Construction 1.6 2.7 11.9 31.0 47.2
Trade 0.4 2.0 26.8 43.6 72.9
Business services 1.7 5.9 7.6 39.6 54.8
Financial services 0.0 1.2 37.7 56.5 95.5
Very small ¯rms 2.9 5.9 8.7 20.0 37.5
Small ¯rms 4.2 2.7 10.1 18.6 35.5
Medium-sized ¯rms 2.2 2.0 15.1 29.1 48.4
Large ¯rms 1.6 5.9 15.7 47.7 70.9
Source: Druant et al. (2009) and Martins (2009).
Results weighted by employment.
5 Wage rigidity: evidence and alternative adjust-
ment mechanisms
5.1 Evidence on downward (real and nominal) wage rigidity
The concept of nominal wage rigidity is frequently associated with legal or con-
tractual constraints which hinder ¯rms from reducing the wages of their workers18.
In Portugal, there has been a legislative framework since the 1950s barring ¯rms
from reducing wages, which would suggest a high degree of downward nominal wage
rigidity in Portugal.
The questionnaire contained two questions with the main aim of assessing the
extent to which the possibility of ¯rms reducing their base wages or increasing them
below the in°ation rate is constrained by legal or contractual factors19. The ¯rst
of these questions, ¯rms were asked if they would have considered the possibility of
changing their base wages in 2006 (the reference year in the survey) in an amount
below the one that was agreed. If the answer was a±rmative, ¯rms should indicate
18A current has been developing recently in the literature on the issue of wage rigidity stemming
from the availability of longitudinal databases such as the QP and the BDRR. In the context of
this literature, nominal wage rigidity is normally illustrated through empirical distributions of wage
changes, where there is an almost total absence of negative wage variations and a notable mass of
probability at zero (see Portugal (2006) and Duarte (2008)). This restriction, however, does not
eliminate the possibility of ¯rms reducing real wages in response to adverse shocks. All that is
necessary for this is to make sure that the (non-negative) variation in nominal wages is less than
the expected rate of in°ation. Given this, real wage rigidity is usually measured as the proportion
of workers with a wage variation rate close to the expected rate of in°ation. In the absence of real
rigidity, the wage variation of these workers would be more moderate.
19These two questions were only included in the Portuguese version of the questionnaire.
18Table 3: Indicators of downward nominal and real base wage rigidity
(in percentage)
Firms that would like Firms that would like to
to have their base have their base wage increased





Business services 1.2 3.1
Financial services 0.0 0.0
Very small ¯rms 2.9 3.9
Small ¯rms 4.8 6.9
Medium-sized ¯rms 2.5 3.5




Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). Results weighted by employment.
the desired change in base wages. As a measure of downward nominal base wage
rigidity it was considered the share of ¯rms that would like to reduce their base
wages, while the share of ¯rms that would like to increase their base wages below
the in°ation rate was used as a measure of downward real base wage rigidity. Results
show that a small fraction of ¯rms would consider the possibility of reducing their
base wages in 2006 if there were no legal or contractual restrictions. These ¯rms
account for 1.6 per cent of total employment in the sample (Table 3), with this
share being higher in ¯rms applying collective wage agreements, in manufacturing
and smaller ¯rms. On the other hand, those ¯rms that would have considered the
possibility of increasing their base wages in 2006 below the in°ation rate in that
year account for 4.4 per cent of total employment in the sample.
Following the pioneering work of Blinder and Choi (1990), Babecky et al. (2009a)
present an alternative approach to assess nominal and real wage rigidity. In their
work, downward nominal wage rigidity is de¯ned as the share of ¯rms that state
they have frozen wages at least once in the past ¯ve years. The hypothesis that
is assumed is similar to the one used by Dickens et al. (2007), who assumed that
¯rms that freeze their workers' wage would, in the absence of nominal rigidity, be
accepting a cut in wage. This hypothesis assumes, of course, that those ¯rms that
never froze their workers' wages over the ¯ve years prior to the survey do not consider
the impossibility of reducing nominal wages as an active restriction. In relation to
real rigidity, the choice of an indicator is not nearly so clear-cut.
Babecky et al. (2009a) consider as a yardstick for the real rigidity of wages the
percentage of ¯rms that accept the existence of an automatic connection between
19Table 4: Alternative indicators of downward nominal and real wage rigidity
(in percentage)
Firms that have frozen their Firms with formal
base wages at least once wage indexation





Business services 38.0 7.6
Financial services 0.0 1.2
Very small ¯rms 11.9 8.2
Small ¯rms 18.3 9.5
Medium-sized ¯rms 18.1 7.7






Source: Babecky et al. (2009a) and survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Results weighted by employment
the variation of their wages and in°ation (past or expected). This is clearly a
measure that restricts the degree of real rigidity and, as such, any ¯ndings should
be treated with caution. The results show that nominal rigidity is markedly more
prevalent in the ¯rms under review than real rigidity (Table 4). These ¯ndings
are in line with those obtained for the United States and for the United Kingdom,
but di®erent from those found in many EA countries. It should be noted that the
evidence adduced for various European countries using these two indicators reveals
considerable di®erences, both in relation to nominal and real rigidity (see Babecky
et al. (2009a)). Nominal rigidity is, apart from Portugal, particularly strong in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany and the Netherlands, while it is markedly weaker
in Belgium, Greece and Poland. Moreover, real rigidity is signi¯cant in Belgium
and Spain, countries where wage indexation is a common practice, in France and in
Hungary, but not relevant in Italy, Greece, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia.
The ¯ndings obtained from our survey show that legal restrictions do have an
impact on reduction or freezing of wages, but workers' morale and performance are
equally important in a context where ¯rms have to bring labour costs down (Table
5)20.
20Results do not change by much when it is considered only those ¯rms that, in the absence of
legal or contractual constraints, would have considered the possibility of reducing their base wages
in 2006 or increasing them below the in°ation rate.
20Table 5: Main obstacles to wage cuts/freezes
(in percentage)
Factors Score(a) Factors Score(a)
Wage agreements Impact on ¯rm's
and legislation(b) 3.58 reputation 2.93
Impact on workers' Wages may become
morale 3.44 non competitive 2.92
Impact on workers' Di±culties in attracting
performance 3.39 new workers 2.83
Impact from unexpected Hiring and training costs
changes in wages 3.37 of new workers 2.73
Risk of losing the best workers 3.29
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal. Results weighted by employment.
(a)Average score on a scale from 1 ("Irrelevant") to 4 ("Very relevant") weighted
by employment. (b)This factor is only relevant for wage cuts.
5.2 Alternative adjustment mechanisms
In an environment of sticky prices and wages, non-wage labour costs become na im-
portant adjustment tool to exogenous shocks, acting as a bu®er to negative demand
shocks on ¯rms' employment (see Chen and Funke (2003)). Indeed, the importance
of wage rigidity clearly depends on the availability of other mechanisms through
which ¯rms can reduce their labour costs without changing the base wages. The
information obtained from the survey provides unique evidence on the relevant im-
portance of those alternative mechanisms. In this context, ¯rms were asked if had
at any time had recourse to ways of cutting labour costs without changing their base
wage. These mechanisms include the possibility of reducing or cutting out monetary
and non-monetary bonuses, taking on new workers with the same characteristics as
those who left but on a lower wage, changing the shifts policy, taking longer over
promotions or reducing the number of employees. The ¯rms had the chance to
choose more than one of these options. The results show that around 70 per cent
of the ¯rms have already used at least one of these strategies to cut labour costs,
above all larger ¯rms and those that apply collective wage agreements (Table 6).
Reducing the number of employees is by far the most frequently used alternative,
particularly in ¯nancial services and in larger ¯rms. Other frequently used mecha-
nisms are taking longer over promotions or introducing a freeze, and hiring workers
at wages below those who leave.
6 Reaction of ¯rms to shocks
The information gathered from the survey also made it possible to analyse the way
¯rms reacted to unexpected and generalised adverse shocks. Three types of shocks
21Table 6: Alternative strategies to reduce labour costs
(in percentage)
Reduce Reduce Change Reduce Hire new Reduce At least
monet. non-monet. shifts pace of workers at number one
bene¯ts bene¯ts policy promotions lower wages workers strategy
Total 20.1 19.2 12.8 27.6 24.0 56.6 70.5
Manufact. 17.2 11.0 13.2 14.1 23.2 57.1 70.3
Constr. 8.5 5.5 8.3 17.1 15.7 47.4 55.4
Trade 28.3 18.6 19.9 30.5 28.5 52.6 68.4
Bus. serv. 16.5 22.1 13.9 26.0 20.6 53.2 69.8
Finan. serv. 41.1 40.0 0.0 77.9 41.5 82.3 87.2
Firms' size:
Very small 5.1 4.4 3.0 9.4 5.3 30.7 44.7
Small 15.7 10.2 7.4 14.9 15.5 40.4 57.6
Medium 17.2 9.1 13.1 14.8 19.5 42.7 62.9
Large 21.2 22.6 13.0 31.8 25.8 61.4 73.5
Coll. agr.:
Yes 24.0 24.1 13.7 27.4 23.0 63.4 75.2
No 9.3 6.3 10.7 27.9 27.4 39.0 58.7
Memo:
EA 20.6 - 21.4 25.2 38.8 20.7(a) 63.5
Source: Babecky et al. (2009b) and survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). Results
weighted by employment.
were given: a fall in demand for the main product; a highly relevant rise in the cost of
an intermediate good, such as a rise in the price of fuel; and a permanent rise in wages
due, for example, to the renegotiation of collective wage agreements. Firms were
asked to put a value between 1 ("Irrelevant") and 4 ("Very relevant") on the relative
importance of the following four strategies relating to adjustments to the shocks
suggested: i) a change to prices; ii) a change to margins; iii) a cut in production;
iv) a cut in costs. The results are given in Table 7 and they show that, regardless
of the type of shock, a cut in other costs seems clearly to be the dominant strategy.
However, adjustments to prices and margins are also used, as opposed to reducing
production, which comes in as far less relevant, with the exception of demand shocks.
In addition, shocks to demand seem to be those that on average a®ect ¯rms most
forcibly. It should be noted that the strategies used are not mutually exclusive.
Firms may combine more than one, and the most frequent combination is to cut
other costs at the same time as adjusting prices.
Those ¯rms where the strategy of cutting costs was deemed to be to be relevant
or very relevant were asked to indicate the most likely way to reduce those costs,
having in mind the three types of shocks and two skill levels. Firms could opt for one
of six strategies: i) a cut in base wages; ii) a cut in the °exible components of wages;
iii) a cut in the number of workers with permanent contracts; iv) a cut in the number
of workers with temporary contracts; v) a cut in the number of working hours; vi)
22Table 7: Firms' reaction to unanticipated shocks
Demand shock Cost shock Wage shock
Score(a) Share(b) Score(a) Share(b) Score(a) Share(b)
Reduce other costs 3.7 80.9 3.1 71.8 3.1 68.4
Adjusting prices 3.0 64.0 3.0 62.7 2.8 58.1
Reduce margins 3.1 56.7 2.7 47.7 2.7 53.4
Reduce production 3.3 48.9 2.3 23.5 2.2 20.9
Source: Babecky et al. (2009b) and Survey on wage setting in Portugal. Results
weighted by employment.
Notes: (a)Average score on a scale from 1 ("Irrelevant") to 4 ("Very relevant")
weighted by the number of workers. (b)Firms that consider the shock as being
relevant or very relevant (as a percentage of total employment in the sample.)
Table 8: Strategies to reduce costs: by type of shock and workers' quali¯cation
(as a percentage of total employment in the sample)
After a demand After a cost After a wage
shock shock shock
Skilled Unskill. Skilled Unskill. Skilled Unskill.
Reducing:
Base wages 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.2 - -
Flexible wage component 28.7 14.2 26.5 13.5 15.2 26.1
Workers permanent contract 5.5 10.2 5.9 9.7 9.1 7.9
Workers temporary contract 16.6 34.8 13.6 30.0 33.3 16.2
Hours per worker 7.2 9.1 5.5 8.0 6.9 4.8
Other costs 40.0 30.5 47.0 37.5 35.5 44.9
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
a cut in other costs. Other costs included advertising costs, administrative costs,
or the costs of renegotiating prices with suppliers. The results are given in Table 8,
which shows that most ¯rms in Portugal put reduction in other costs as the most
likely strategy in almost all the scenarios set out. Firms also seem to di®erentiate
between workers according to their skill levels. Apart from cutting other costs, in
the event of an adverse shock on demand or on the price of a relevant raw material,
¯rms would opt more for a cut in the °exible components of wages for more quali¯ed
workers and a cut in the number of workers with temporary contracts in the case
of less skilled workers. Where there is a shock to wages, the relationship between
these two strategies and the level of quali¯cations is inverted.
7 Concluding remarks
Recent research points to the existence of a negative relationship between price
rigidity and ¯rms' labour cost share. In particular, empirical evidence based on mi-
croeconomic data shows that sectors with higher labour cost share are those where
changes to prices are less frequent. Other measurements of price rigidity based on
23qualitative information presented in this paper are consistent with these ¯ndings.
They include the frequency of price changes, the speed of price changes when shocks
occur or the importance of time-dependent pricing rules. This evidence suggests
that a deeper knowledge of wage dynamics is crucial for a better understanding of
how prices are determined and, in a more general way, how the monetary policy
transmission mechanism works. There are other factors that justify the increasing
interest in research in this area. They include the importance of the labour markets
in explaining the cyclical behaviour of the economy and the persistence of structural
rigidity factors in labour markets. Empirical research is fundamental for the de¯ni-
tion of stylised facts on wage dynamics, while theoretical research is important to
adequately incorporate the behaviour of labour markets in stochastic models of gen-
eral equilibrium. Based on the information from a survey conducted by the Banco
de Portugal in the ¯rst half of 2008, this paper presented a number of stylised facts
on price and wage dynamics in Portugal. These facts are summed up below:
1. A small fraction of the ¯rms surveyed state that, in the absence of legal or
contractual constraints, would consider the possibility of reducing their base
wages in 2006 or increase them below the in°ation rate;
2. Apart from legal and contractual constraints, the impact on workers' morale
or performance and the risk that the best workers leave the ¯rm are other
important obstacles to wage cuts or freezes;
3. Firms frequently make use of alternative mechanisms to reduce labour costs,
rather than changes to base wages, with cuts in the number of workers being
the most frequent form of adjustment;
4. In many ¯rms the wage scale agreed in the context of collective wage agree-
ments is taken merely as a reference, with a considerable percentage of workers
receiving wages above the amount agreed in collective wage agreements;
5. Most wages are de¯ned with the behaviour of in°ation borne in mind, above
all expected in°ation, though without any formal rule;
6. Changes in wages occur less frequently than changes in prices. If frequencies
are converted into durations, it can be seen that the average duration of wages
is slightly higher than one year - about 2 months less than in the euro area
and 2.0 months longer than the average duration of prices;
7. Sectoral variability of wage durations is signi¯cantly lower than that of prices.
This is also found in most European countries;
248. Changes to wages are more closely synchronised than changes to prices. 81 per
cent of ¯rms concentrate their wage changes in speci¯c months of the year (37
per cent in the case of prices), with a very signi¯cant fraction making these
changes in January.
Recent empirical evidence has thrown down a major challenge to researchers. New
facts have come to light as a result of analysing large-scale microeconomic databases,
either quantitative ones or those based on surveys of ¯rms. This should act as a spur
for the scienti¯c community to develop theories that incorporate this new evidence
in models of general equilibrium.
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The Banco de Portugal guarantees the strict confidentiality of your answers, which will be only used for economic research. 
Unless otherwise stated, your answers should refer to 2006. 
 
Company name: ______________________________________________ NACE Rev. 2.1 (5 digits): ______________________ 
Fiscal number: ____________________ Phone number _________________ E-mail: __________________________________ 
Date: __– __– ____ Name of the person(s) that answered the questionnaire: _________________________________________ 
Section 1: General information 
 1.  How many workers did your firm have at the end of 2006? 
Number of employees ….………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…..… 
 number 
  of which : (in percentage)   
    Full-time with permanent contract ………..………………………………..……………………………….…………….……………. 
 % 
    Part-time with permanent contract ……...………………………………………………………………..………………….………… 
 % 
    Temporary……………………………………………….……………………………………………………..……….………………………… 
 % 
    Other types of contracts.………………………….……………………………………………………..……….………………………… 
 % 
Total  (should add up to 100%) …………………………………………………………………………………………..….…………………….  100% 
Other types of workers (e.g. people employed by agencies or free lancers,…) ……………………………………….……… 
 number 
 2.  How many employees left your firm in 2006? (see annex)…………………………………………………………………….   number 
 3.  How many employees were hired by your firm in 2006? (see annex) …………………………………………………….   number 
4.  Describe the distribution of your firm’s employees according to the following occupational groups: (see annex) 
Non-qualified employees linked to production ……………………………………………………...……..………………………….. 
 % 
Qualified employees linked to production …………………………………….…………….………..…………………………………. 
 % 
Non-qualified employees not linked to production ………………..……………………….…….…..……………………………….. 
 % 
Qualified employees not linked to production …………………………………………..……..……..……………….……………….. 
 % 
Total (should add up to 100%) ………………………………………………………………….…………………………………..………..  100% 
5.  Considering your profit and losses account in 2006, what was the percentage of labour costs in your firm’s total 
costs? (see annex) …………………………………………………………………………………………………….………….   % 
6.  Compared to the previous year, your firm’s sales in 2006 were: (see annex) 
Lower …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….   
Approximately the same ……………………..………………………………..………………………………………………………………….   
Higher …………………………………………………..………………………………………………………….……………………………………   
Section 2: Wage setting 
7.  In 2006, what was the average increase in your firm’s base wage? (see annex) ……………….….…   % 
8.  If there were no legal or contractual constraints, would you consider the possibility of changing the base wage in your firm in 
2006 in an amount different from that reported in the previous question? 
  Yes   No   
 
                          Page 2 
  8.1  If you answered “No” in the previous question, go to question 9; if you answered “Yes”, what would be 
the average change in your firm’s base wage in this case? (choose only one option)   
    The average base wage would increase by (this value should be lower that the one indicated in 7)   % 
    The average base wage would decline by (in case you opt for a wage decrease)   % 
9.  Does your firm apply a external collective agreement (national or sectoral)? (choose only one option) 
 
 Yes, and my firm is directly represented in the wage negotiations …………………………….…………………..……………   
 Yes, but my firm is not directly represented in the wage negotiations ………………………………………………..……….   
 No .……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….   
10.  Independently of your previous answer, is there any firm-level agreement in your firm?   
 Yes …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..…………………………………….   
 No ..……………………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………….   
11.  If you answered “No” to questions 9 and 10, go to question 13; if you answered “Yes” to at least one of them, 
please answer the following questions: 
 
  11.1  What percentage of your firm’s employees is covered by collective wage agreements (including firm level 
agreements) ………………..…………………………………………………………………………………………….….   % 
  11.2  Indicate if base wages in your firm are exactly those set in the collectively agreed wage schedule: 





employees   
             Yes .................................................................................................................. 
     
             No ..................................................................................................................       
12.  If you answered “No” in question 11.2 to at least one level of qualification, indicate on average the percentage in 
which the base wages are above those agreed in the collective agreement:   % 
13. 
 
In 2006, what was the share (in percentage) of base wages in your total wage? (see annex) ……............ 
 % 
14.  Does your firm take into account inflation developments when deciding about changes in base wages? (see 
annex)  
 
 Yes ………………….....……………………………….……………………….…………………………………………………………………….   
 No, go to question 16 ……………….……..………………………………………………………………………………………………….…   
15.  If you answered “Yes” in question 14, please choose among the options below the one that reflects best such policy (see annex) 
Wage changes are automatically linked to mainly to past inflation ……………………………………………………………..   
Wage changes are automatically linked to mainly to expected inflation …..…………………………………………………..   
Wage changes take into account without a formal rule mainly past inflation ……………………………………………….   
Wage changes take into account without a formal rule mainly expected inflation ….………………………………………   
16.  What is the most frequent principle of remuneration in your firm? (choose only one option; see annex) 
Hourly base wage ……………………………..………………………………………………….…………………………………………….…   
Piece-rate base wage ….………………………………………………..……….………………………………………………………..…….   
Monthly base wage ………………………………………………………..………..………..………..…………………………………..…….   
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17.  Consider the main occupational group in your firm (as defined in question 4). How frequently is the base wage typically changed 
for this group? (choose only one option in each line; see annex) 
 
More than 
once a year 









Wage changes due to inflation …….…….……….………..……          
         
Wage changes due to tenure …………………………………..…. 
         
Other factors… ………………………………………………..…..…… 
         
18.  Under normal circumstances, are base wage changes concentrated in any particular month(s)? 
No …………………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………….............. 
 
Yes, please indicate which: 
                   
              Jan     Feb     Mar     Apr     May     Jun     Jul     Aug     Sep     Oct     Nov     Dec   
 
19.  Please indicate among the following options what is the most relevant factor in determining the entry wage of newly hired 





employees   
Collective wage agreement (at any level) .................................................................... 
     
Entry wage of similar employees in the firm ……………………………………….....................       
Entry wage of similar employees outside the firm ……………………………………………......       
Availability of similar workers in the labour market ……………………………………….........       
Section 3: Wage rigidity 
20.  Over the last 5 years, has the base wage of some workers in your firm ever been frozen? (see annex)   
No ………….…………………………..……………………………………………………………………………..….…………................……………..   
Yes (indicate the percentage of employees affected in the last situation) ……………………………………….…………………….. 
 % 
21.  Over the last 5 years, has the base wage of some workers in your firm ever been cut?   
 No ……………………………………………………………………………….…………………………………….........................…………………….   
 Yes (indicate the percentage of employees affected in the last situation) ….………………………….………………..…………….. 
 % 
22.  I f you answered “Yes” to questions 20 or 21, what was the main reason why the base wage was cut or frozen? 
(please choose only the most relevant option) 
 
Because there was a decline in profits and/or in sales ........................................................................................   
Because there was an increase in other costs ......................................................................................................   
To avoid dismissals …….......................................................................................................................................   
Because it was imposed by legislation or higher level collective agreement ........................................................   
Because the performance of the affected workers was not satisfactory….............................................................   
None of the above reasons ……………………............................................................................................................   
23.  Have you ever used any of the following strategies to reduce labour costs? 
(please choose one option in each line) 
 
  Yes No 
Recruitment of new employees with similar skills and experience at a wage lower than that of those who left the 
firm …………………………...................………………………………………………………….……………………………..     
Reduction or elimination of bonus payments an other monetary benefits …...……………..…………………………     
Reduction or elimination of non-monetary benefits …………………………………………………………………………..…     
Change the policy of shifts (reducing the number of hours and/or the shift payments) ................……………     
Reducing the number of employees .………….………………………………………………………..……………………………..     
Slowdown or freeze the rate at which promotions are filled …………………………………………………………………     
    
24.  How relevant are the following factors as obstacles to wage cuts or freezes in a context where your firm needs to 
reduce labour costs? (please choose only the most relevant option) 
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  Irrelevant  Of little 
relevance 
Relevant  Very relevant  Don’t know 
The labour regulation or the collective agreement.………           
The negative impact on employees’ effort ……..……………..           
The negative impact on employees’ morale …………………..           
The negative impact on firm’s reputation ……………………..           
The risk that best employees leave the firm ……………..…..           
The costs of hiring and training new employees …….……..           
The difficulties in attracting new employees …………………           
The problems created by unpredictable reductions in 
employees’ income ..……….………………………………………….           
The fear that wages could become not competitive when 
compared with those of similar workers in other firms ….           
25.  How would your firm react to an unanticipated slowdown in the demand of your main product? (please 
choose only one option in each line; see annex) 
 
  Irrelevant 
Of little 
relevance 
Relevant  Very relevant  Don’t know 
Reduce prices ………..…….…………………………….…………….           
Reduce margins ......................................……………….......           
Reduce output ………………………………………………………….           
Reduce costs …………………………………………………..……….           
26.  If the reduction of costs was not considered “relevant” or “very relevant”, go to question 27; otherwise, 
indicate the main channel through which the reduction in costs is achieved:  






employees   
Reduce base wages ……….............................................................................................       
Reduce flexible wage components (bonuses, benefits, etc.) …………………....................       
Reduce the number of employees with permanent contract .........................................       
Reduce the number of employees with temporary contract or other type of workers ..       
Reduce the number of hours worked per employee ……………………………………………….       
Reduce other non-labour costs ......................................…………………………………………       
27.  How would your firm react to an unanticipated increase in the cost of an intermediate input (e.g. an 
increase in the price of a relevant raw material such as fuel) affecting all firms in the market? (please 
choose only one option in each line);(see annex) 
 
  Irrelevant 
Of little 
relevance 
Relevant  Very relevant  Don’t know 
Increase prices ……………….…………………………………….….. 
         
Reduce margins ………………………………………….…………….. 
         
Reduce output ………………………………………………………….. 
         
Reduce other costs ..…………………………………..……………… 
         
28.  If the reduction of costs was not considered “relevant” or “very relevant”, go to question 29; otherwise, 
indicate the main channel through which the reduction in costs is achieved:  






employees   
Reduce base wages ………......................................................................................................       
Reduce flexible wage components (bonuses, benefits, etc.) ………………...............................       
Reduce the number of employees with permanent contract .................................................       
Reduce the number of employees with temporary contract or other type of workers ………..       
Reduce the number of hours worked per employee ……………………………………………………….       
Reduce other non-labour costs .....................................…………………………….……………………       
29.  How would your firm react to an unanticipated increase in wages (e.g. due to the renewal of the national 
contract) affecting all firms in the market? (please choose only one option in each line);(see annex) 
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  Irrelevant 
Of little 
relevance 
Relevant  Very relevant  Don’t know 
Increase prices ……………….…………………………………….….. 
         
Reduce margins ………………………………………….…………….. 
         
Reduce output ………………………………………………………….. 
         
Reduce other costs ..…………………………………..……………… 
         
30.  If the reduction of costs was not considered “relevant” or “very relevant”, go to question 31; otherwise, 
indicate the main channel through which the reduction in costs is achieved:  






employees   
Reduce flexible wage components (bonuses, benefits, etc.) ………………....................       
Reduce the number of employees with permanent contract .......................................       
Reduce the number of employees with temporary contract or other type of workers .       
Reduce the number of hours worked per employee …………………………………………….       
Reduce other non-labour costs ...................................…………………………………………       
     
Section 4: Wage and price setting 
Questions in this section are related to your main product (a good or a service), defined as the one that generated the 
highest fraction of your revenue in 2006. 
31.  How does the timing of these price changes relate to that o wage changes? (please indicate only the most 
relevant option) 
 
There is no link between the two ……………………………………………………………………….………..………………………………………..   
There is a link but not a particular pattern ….…………………………………………………………..……………………………..….…………..   
Decisions are taken simultaneously ………………………..………………………………………….………………………………………………….   
Price changes are defined after wages are set ………………………………………..………..…………………………..………………………..   
Wage changes are defined after prices are set ……………………………………..………..…………………………..………………………..   
This question does not apply to our firm since we don’t have autonomy to set our prices and/or wages ……………………….   
32.  In 2006, what share of your revenue was generated by the sale of your main product in the following markets?   
Domestic market …………………………….……………………….………………………………………………………………………………… 
 % 
Foreign markets …………………………………………….……….………………………………………………………………………………….   % 
Total (should add up to 100%) ………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………..  100% 
33.  How is the price of your main product set in its main market (identified in the previous question)? (please 
indicate only the most relevant option) 
 
The price is not set autonomously because it is regulated by an external entity (Government, regulatory body, parent 
company/group,…) ………………...................................…………………………………………………………………………   
The price is not set autonomously because it follows largely the price(s) of our main competitor(s) ….………………   
The price is not set autonomously because it is largely set by of our main customer(s) ….…………………….……………   
The price is set autonomously by our firm but it is largely affected by the price(s) of our main competitor(s) ………   
The price is set autonomously by our firm without being largely affected by the price(s) of our main competitor(s)   
34.  How would you classify the degree of price competition experienced by your firm vis-à-vis your 
main product? (please indicate only the most relevant option) 
 
Severe competition ……………………………………………………….…….………………………………………….………………………….   
Strong competition …..………………………………………………………………….………………………………………………………..……   
Weak competition ….……………………………………..………………….…………………………………………….………………………….   
No competition ………………………….…………………………………………..………………………………………….……………………….   
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35.  Suppose your main competitor decreases its price; how likely is your to react by decreasing its own price? (please 
indicate only the most relevant option) 
 
Very likely ………………………………………..………………………………………………………..…………………………………….……...   
Likely ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………………….….   
Not likely ....................................……………………………………………………….………………………………………………………..   
Not at all …………….……………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………..……………   
It doesn’t apply ................................................……………………………………………..……………………………………………..   
36.  Companies differ in the speed their prices respond to significant changes in demand and costs.   
In response to a very significant increase in your production costs, how much time elapses before you raise the price of 
your main product? (choose only one of the two following options) 
 
                          months (indicate the number of months, if less than 1 year)                          more than 1 year   
In response to a very significant decrease in your production costs, how much time elapses before you reduce the price 
of your main product? (choose only one of the two following options) 
 
                          months (indicate the number of months, if less than 1 year)                          more than 1 year   
In response to a very significant increase in your main product’s demand, how much time elapses before you raise its 
price? (choose only one of the two following options)   
                          months (indicate the number of months, if less than 1 year)                          more than 1 year   
In response to a very significant decrease in your main product’s demand, how much time elapses before you reduce its 
price? (choose only one of the two following options)   
                          months (indicate the number of months, if less than 1 year)                          more than 1 year   
37.  The price of your main product is changed (please indicate only the most relevant option)   
At a well-defined frequency (annually, quarterly, …) ………………………….………………………………………………………   
Generally at a defined frequency, but sometimes also in reaction to market conditions (changes in the price of 
raw materials or in demand conditions,…) ………………………………………….……………….…………………….…….   
Without any defined frequency, being reviewed in reaction to market conditions (changes in the price of raw 
materials or in demand conditions,…) ………………….………………………….…………………………………………..….   
This question does not apply to my company ………………………………………………………….………………………………….   
38.  Under normal circumstances, at what frequency is the price of your main product changed? (please 
choose the option closest to your particular situation) 
 
Daily .……………………………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………………………   
Weekly ………………………..…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………   
Fortnightly ……………………………………….……………….……………………………………………………………….………………….   
Monthly …………………………………………………………………….……………………………….………………………………………….   
Quarterly.………………………………………………………………………….……………….………………….……………………………….   
Half-yearly ……………………………………………………………………………….……………….…….…….………………………………   
Yearly …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..   
Every two years …………………………………………………………………..…………………………….………………………….   
Less than once every two years …………………………………………..………………………………………………………….   
There is no defined pattern …..………………………………………………………………………………………………………..   
39.  Under normal circumstances, are price changes concentrated in any particular month(s)?   
No ……………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………………………….   
Yes, please indicate which: 
                   










It relates to all employees with contract (permanent or not) that left your firm in 2006, 
including those who were hired in that year. It excludes, for instance, freelance workers or 
workers employed by agencies. 
Question 3 
It relates to all employees that signed contract (permanent or not) in 2006, including those 
who were hired in that year. It excludes, for instance, freelance workers or workers 
employed by agencies. 
Question 4 
In this question you could consider the following correspondence between the occupational 
groups and the levels of qualification that you usually consider when filling the Ministry of 
Employment Personnel Database questionnaire (Decree-law 121/78): 
 
Occupational  groups:  Levels of qualification from the Ministry of 
Employment Personnel Database: 
  Non-qualified employees linked to production  6.2; 7.2 
  Qualified employees linked to production  2.2; 4.2; 5.3 
  Non-qualified employees not linked to production  6.1; 6.3; 7.1; 7.3 
  Qualified employees not linked to production  1; 2.1; 3; 4.1; 4.3; 5.1; 5.2; 5.4 
Question 5 
Share (in percentage) of labour costs (total of account 64) in total costs (total of class 6) of 
the Official Accounting Plan (OAP). 
Question 6 
Please take as a reference the sum of your sales (account 71), if your main product is a 
good, or of service repayments (account 72), if your main product is a service. 
Question 7 
Base wage is the direct remuneration which excludes those wage components related to 
firm’s or employees’ performance, like bonuses or commissions, as well as meal allowances. 
Question 13 
This question aims at measuring the share (in percentage) of the flexible wage components 
(wages excluding base wages) in total remunerations (sum of accounts 641 and 642 of the 
OAP). 
Question 14 
Even if your firm does not participate directly in the wage negotiations you could answer this 
question if you have enough information to do so. 
Question 15 
Expected inflation includes inflation forecasts for the year for which wages are set as well as 
all the subsequent years. 
Question 16 
This question does not aim at knowing the frequency of wage payments (monthly, weekly,…) 
but the remuneration principle. In this context, if the most frequent remuneration principle 
in your firm is wage per hour, you should indicate this option even if the payment is only 
made, for instance, at the end of the month. 
Question 17 
Base wage increases due to “Tenure” are only the permanent base wage increases related 
to the number of working years of each employee, excluding for instance any ad-hoc 
antiquity premium. You should indicate “Never” for those options which are not relevant in 
your firm. 
Question 20 
A base wage freeze describes a situation where the base wage remains unchanged after the 
usual period of revision. 
Question 25 
The options presented are not of course exclusive. For instance, a firm can reduce prices by 
reducing margins and/or reducing costs by cutting its production. This question aims at 
assessing the relative importance of each option. If, for instance, in the situation described 
in this question you opted to reduce prices by reducing margins you should mark this two 
options as “relevant” or “very relevant” and the remaining as “of little relevance” or 
“irrelevant”. 
Question 27  See instructions for question 25. 
Question 29  See instructions for question 25. 
 Banco de Portugal | Working Papers i
WORKING PAPERS
2010
1/10  MEASURING COMOVEMENT IN THE TIME-FREQUENCY SPACE
  — António Rua
2/10  EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM MATCHED FIRM-WORKER-PRODUCT PANELS
  — Pedro S. Martins, Luca David Opromolla
3/10  NONSTATIONARY EXTREMES AND THE US BUSINESS CYCLE
  — Miguel de Carvalho, K. Feridun Turkman, António Rua
4/10  EXPECTATIONS-DRIVEN CYCLES IN THE HOUSING MARKET
  — Luisa Lambertini, Caterina Mendicino, Maria Teresa Punzi
5/10  COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF BANK MERGERS
  — Pedro P. Barros, Diana Bonﬁ  m, Moshe Kim, Nuno C. Martins
6/10  THE EAGLE. A MODEL FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE EURO AREA
  — S. Gomes, P. Jacquinot, M. Pisani
7/10  A WAVELET APPROACH FOR FACTOR-AUGMENTED FORECASTING
  — António Rua
8/10  EXTREMAL DEPENDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL OUTPUT GROWTH: TALES FROM THE TAILS
  — Miguel de Carvalho, António Rua
9/10  TRACKING THE US BUSINESS CYCLE WITH A SINGULAR SPECTRUM ANALYSIS
  — Miguel de Carvalho, Paulo C. Rodrigues, António Rua
10/10 A MULTIPLE CRITERIA FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE BANK BRANCH POTENTIAL ATTRACTIVENESS
  — Fernando A. F. Ferreira, Ronald W. Spahr, Sérgio P. Santos, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
11/10 THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIVE OUTLIERS AND MEASUREMENT ERRORS WHEN TESTING FOR STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
IN VARIANCE
  — Paulo M. M. Rodrigues, Antonio Rubia
12/10 CALENDAR EFFECTS IN DAILY ATM WITHDRAWALS
  — Paulo Soares Esteves, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
13/10  MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF RANDOM VECTORS GENERATED BY AFFINE TRANSFORMATIONS OF 
INDEPENDENT TWO-PIECE NORMAL VARIABLES
  — Maximiano Pinheiro
14/10 MONETARY POLICY EFFECTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE PORTUGUESE FLOW OF FUNDS
  — Isabel Marques Gameiro, João Sousa
15/10 SHORT AND LONG INTEREST RATE TARGETS
  — Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia, Pedro Teles
16/10 FISCAL STIMULUS IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix, José Francisco Maria
17/10 FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC SPENDING VOLATILITY IN EUROPE
  — Bruno AlbuquerqueBanco de Portugal | Working Papers ii
18/10 GLOBAL POLICY AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND IN A LARGE-SCALE DSGE MODEL
  — S. Gomes, P. Jacquinot, R. Mestre, J. Sousa
19/10 LABOR IMMOBILITY AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF MONETARY POLICY IN A MONETARY UNION
  — Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia
20/10 TAXATION AND GLOBALIZATION
  — Isabel Correia
21/10 TIME-VARYING FISCAL POLICY IN THE U.S.
  — Manuel Coutinho Pereira, Artur Silva Lopes
22/10 DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN BOND YIELD SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ECONOMIC 
AND FINANCIAL CRISIS
  — Luciana Barbosa, Sónia Costa
23/10 FISCAL STIMULUS AND EXIT STRATEGIES IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY 
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix, José Francisco Maria
24/10 FORECASTING INFLATION (AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE?) WITH MONETARY AGGREGATES
  — João Valle e Azevedo, Ana Pereira
25/10 THE SOURCES OF WAGE VARIATION: AN ANALYSIS USING MATCHED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DATA
  — Sónia Torres,Pedro Portugal, John T.Addison, Paulo Guimarães
26/10 THE RESERVATION WAGE UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION NEXUS
  — John T. Addison, José A. F. Machado, Pedro Portugal
27/10 BORROWING PATTERNS, BANKRUPTCY AND VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION
  — José Mata, António Antunes, Pedro Portugal
28/10 THE INSTABILITY OF JOINT VENTURES: LEARNING FROM OTHERS OR LEARNING TO WORK WITH OTHERS
  — José Mata, Pedro Portugal
29/10 THE HIDDEN SIDE OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT: FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS AS A SCREENING DEVICE
  — Pedro Portugal, José Varejão
30/10 TESTING FOR PERSISTENCE CHANGE IN FRACTIONALLY INTEGRATED MODELS: AN APPLICATION TO WORLD 
INFLATION RATES
  — Luis F. Martins, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
31/10 EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES OF IMMIGRANTS IN PORTUGAL
  — Sónia Cabral, Cláudia Duarte
32/10 EVALUATING THE STRENGTH OF IDENTIFICATION IN DSGE MODELS. AN A PRIORI APPROACH
  — Nikolay Iskrev
33/10 JOBLESSNESS
  — José A. F. Machado, Pedro Portugal, Pedro S. Raposo
2011
1/11  WHAT HAPPENS AFTER DEFAULT? STYLIZED FACTS ON ACCESS TO CREDIT
  — Diana Bonﬁ  m, Daniel A. Dias, Christine Richmond
2/11  IS THE WORLD SPINNING FASTER? ASSESSING THE DYNAMICS OF EXPORT SPECIALIZATION
  — João AmadorBanco de Portugal | Working Papers iii
3/11  UNCONVENTIONAL FISCAL POLICY AT THE ZERO BOUND
  — Isabel Correia, Emmanuel Farhi, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Pedro Teles
4/11  MANAGERS’ MOBILITY, TRADE STATUS, AND WAGES
  — Giordano Mion, Luca David Opromolla
5/11  FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix, José Francisco Maria
6/11  CHOOSING BETWEEN TIME AND STATE DEPENDENCE: MICRO EVIDENCE ON FIRMS’ PRICE-REVIEWING 
STRATEGIES
  — Daniel A. Dias, Carlos Robalo Marques, Fernando Martins
7/11  WHY ARE SOME PRICES STICKIER THAN OTHERS? FIRM-DATA EVIDENCE ON PRICE ADJUSTMENT LAGS
  — Daniel A. Dias, Carlos Robalo Marques, Fernando Martins, J. M. C. Santos Silva
8/11  LEANING AGAINST BOOM-BUST CYCLES IN CREDIT AND HOUSING PRICES
  — Luisa Lambertini, Caterina Mendicino, Maria Teresa Punzi
9/11  PRICE AND WAGE SETTING IN PORTUGAL LEARNING BY ASKING
  — Fernando Martins